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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this work has been to perform a security analysis of Android-based 
Smartphones. Smartphone usage and adaptation are increasing day by day with a variety of 
applications. These applications can be very critical in nature such as mobile banking, and 
mobile payment systems and users are often unknowing about the security risks involved in 
such applications.  
 
Android, an open source operating system, is rapidly increasing in the Smartphone industry. 
It has already beaten the most popular mobile operating systems, like RIM, iOS, Windows 
Mobile and even Symbian, which ruled the mobile market for more than a decade. 
 
In this thesis, we have analysed the architecture of the Android operating system and tested 
its security through penetration testing. We have picked the most popular and recommended 
tools to test the security in the TCP/IP suite and different attacks have been performed on 
three different Android versions. The thesis also contains a discussion about our findings, 
how secure the Android system is and how much trust can be placed on it while using it. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Smartphone growth and adaptation is increasing rapidly due to their rich and versatile 
functionality. The versatility and convenience of these devices took them an ahead from other 
apparently similar devices like PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants) or MIDs (Mobile Internet 
Devices).  
 
Nowadays, a Smartphone is not just used to talk; rather it gives functionality of a Pager, PDA 
(Personal Digital Assistants), MID, GPS, MP3 Player, etc., and provides a range of services 
like entertainment, electronic banking, reading e-books or attending office meetings online. 
Such a variety of services can only be delivered with the combination of strong compact 
hardware and fast reliable software including a good Operating System. 
 
Currently, the Android is one of the most popular open source operating systems for 
Smartphones. It was originally developed by Google in 2005. Further development, the 
Android Open Source Project (AOSP) was established by Google and other members of 
Open Handset Alliance. Android is based on the Monolithic kernel (Modified Linux kernel) 
and contains all advanced features like multi-touch, video calling connectivity, multimedia 
messaging and web browsing. Several features and functions help to increase usage of data 
and services but also open the risk for introducing new vulnerabilities. 
 
According to a survey that was released in February 2011 by a customer intelligence firm, 
Market Force, 33% of the individuals don't have a Smartphone, 34 % intend to purchase one 
having an Android operating system in the upcoming six months. From these potential 
customers, 21% said that they would buy an IPhone, 12% said that they would buy a 
Blackberry and 25% did not decided, what to buy [1]. This survey shows the increasing 
interest of potential customers in Android based Smartphones.  
 
Android Smartphones rapid growth and adaptation makes it more attractive for hackers. To 
protect against attacks, as many system vulnerabilities as possible should be found and 
patched on a forehand. To detect the vulnerabilities of a system, penetration testing is a very 
important tool which helps finding security holes in the system. A penetration test, 
occasionally called pentest, is a method of evaluating the security of a computer system or 
network by simulating an attack from a malicious source, known as a Black Hat Hacker or 
Cracker [2]. The methodology for how to perform penetration tests is given by National 
Institute of Standards and Technology [3], see chapter 1.5. Along with penetration testing, a 
general overview about the Android security mechanism is described to give the reader an 
idea of how it works. 
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1.1. History 
 
Mobile operating systems have been in use since the creation of the first mobile phone but 
those operating systems were targeted for specific devices. Most new devices used to come 
with improved operating systems but those improvements were often unnoticeable from the 
view of an ordinary user. With the advent of the Smartphone, the need for secure and robust 
multi-tasking mobile operating systems increased instantly.  
 
The development of hand-held operating systems began for devices like Smartphones, 
personal digital assistants (PDAs) and mobile internet devices (MIDs). Although it is not 
well-defined in the industry what a Smartphone really is, IBM Simon is considered to be the 
first Smartphone [4] which had advanced features for its time where functionality such as 
Fax, Pager and PDAs as introduced. Modern Smartphones have much more advanced 
hardware and stronger operating system support. Nokia Corporation introduced the “Nokia 
Communicator Series”, which is the most prominent milestone towards existing 
Smartphones. GEOS were initially used by Nokia in its communicator series and later in 
2001 the Symbian OS was deployed in the latest model of the time which was the Nokia 
9210 Communicator. Since then, Nokia with its Symbian OS led the Smartphone industry for 
the next ten years.  
 
Android, which was released in 2008, emerged as the major rival of Symbian OS and 
BlackBerry's RIM OS. According to Gartner statistics, in one year (2009 to 2010), Android 
based Smartphones increased their market share from 3% to 23% in the fourth quarter of 
2010 [5]. As the Smartphones become more and more popular, new application development 
and quick releases of new functionality is becoming the key factor for the growth of 
Smartphones. 
1.2. Problem Statement 
 
The Android operating system is based on the Linux kernel which is an open source system 
[6] and provides a network stack for communication. To assess the security of the Android 
network stack, we have explored the Android operating system architecture, and created a 
penetration test methodology based on known attacks against TCP/IP and tools, which are 
needed to make successful penetration tests. 
  
Most studies regarding security of smart phones have mainly focused on the application 
layer, such as viruses, worms, MMS exploitation and Cross-Service Attacks. Research work 
on mobile operating systems began in 2000 and 2001 [7][8], which shows the security of 
memory protection, permission-based file access control, etc. And because of Symbian’s 
leadership in over a decade of the Smartphone industry, most papers published have been 
focusing on the Symbian OS platform and describes the degree of robustness of the network 
stack [9][10][11]. Along with the penetration testing, we have analyzed the security 
mechanisms of the Android OS in this paper. 
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1.3. Objective 
 
The main goals of this thesis are. 
 Explore and describe the Android architecture. 
 Explore the security mechanisms present in the Android OS. 
 Identify and evaluate security problems in the Network stack of the Android OS with 
the help of penetration testing. 
1.4. Scope 
In this thesis, we have described the Android OS with respect to its core architecture and 
TCP/IP network stack security issues. To perform the security analysis, we used white box 
testing. First, the target system was identified and then penetration tests were performed, 
starting from well-known vulnerabilities to more specific deep penetration attacks.  
 
Our focus was on WLAN network connectivity while performing the penetration tests. Like 
any other operating system, the Android OS has versions. Therefore, our target was not only 
one specific version, rather, we tested three versions, 1.6 (Donut) which is the oldest and used 
to be quite popular, 2.1 (Éclair) widely used today and 2.2 (Froyo) who’s adaptation is 
rapidly increasing. We have analysed the improvements that were made in different versions 
by testing the three versions. 
1.5. Penetration Testing Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Penetration Testing Methodology by NIST[12] 
 
In the NIST planning phase, test goals are set, policies are recognized, and management tasks 
are completed and result in reports. The discovery phase describes network port and service 
identification of the target system. At last, attacks are performed and reported. This flow 
works in a cycle to assess the security of the target system [12]. 
  
Our penetration testing methodology is performed in different stages. The first stage gives a 
description of the Android OS such as it is based on Linux kernel, etc. Second stage shows 
discovered closed and open ports, running or disable services and last stage describes the real 
vulnerability that exists in the system by performing some well-known attacks.               
Planning  Discovery  Attacks 
Reports
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1.6.  Thesis outline 
 
Chapter 1 
 
This chapter includes the introduction of the thesis work, objective, problem statement and 
Penetration methodology. 
 
Chapter 2   
 
This chapter describes details the Android OS, its versions history, general architecture and 
Android security mechanisms. 
 
Chapter 3   
 
This chapter describes port scanning, and its output, and summarizes our findings.  
 
Chapter 4  
 
This chapter describes different types of attacks we have performed against the Android 
Network stack, their result and conclusions. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
This Chapter contains an overall conclusion and results. 
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Chapter 2 
Android Overview 
 
Android is a software stack, which contains many things like an operating system, 
middleware and applications for users [13]. Android Inc. was developing it in Palo Alto, 
California in October 2003, and it was purchased by Google Inc. in August 2005 who started 
its further development. A consortium of several companies was formed in November 2007, 
the Open Handset Alliance, which released its first Android Smartphone in October. 2008 
named as HTC G1. 
 
From the start, the Linux kernel was used as a root. The Android system architecture is very 
complex due to the collection of ~185 changed sub-components written under ~19 different 
open source licenses [14]. It is not compatible with the X-windows system functionality 
which is present in the desktop version of Linux and also does not the use Linux libraries [15] 
but uses its own modified java virtual machine for application handling. It does not provide 
any kind of support to run conventional java applications. 
2.1.  Android Version History 
 
In the Android development process many updates have been made, and versions have been 
released with new features and bug fixes. The version’s history is given in the following 
table. 
 
Version
# 
Name Linux Kernel 
version  
Release Date 
1.5  
 
Cupcake 2.6.27 30 April, 2009 
1.6  
 
Donut 2.6.29 15 September, 2009 
2.0 / 2.1  
 
Éclair 2.6.29 26 October, 2009 
2.2  
 
(Froyo) 2.6.32 20 May, 2010 
2.3  Gingerbread 2.6.35 6 December, 2010 
3.0  Honeycomb 2.6.36 January, 2011 
Table 1: Android versions 
2.2.  Android Architecture 
The Android architecture can be divided into four sections that are described below. 
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Figure 2: The Android architecture [16] 
 
2.2.1. Application layer 
The top section contains set of built-in applications such as Calendar, Contacts, e-mail, and a 
Web browser and also contains custom application. These applications are developed in the 
Java and also have the ability to run in a multi-process environment such as listening to music 
while reading an email. The users are able to communicate with these applications directly 
without having the knowledge of how operating system works. Some of the applications are 
already installed in the Smartphone while others can be freely downloaded from the Internet. 
2.2.2.  Application framework 
The application framework is a component-based framework where an application developer 
can build new, rich and modern applications. This architecture is designed in such a way that 
it provides reusable components, for example, scrollbar elements, which are used by many 
components. The Application framework is completely written in the Java language and 
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consists of a huge set of the classes, interfaces and packages. There are four main types of 
Android application components and the details of these components are given below. 
 Activities 
Activities are tasks that the user performs through the graphical user interface. In an 
application, an activity can be a single activity for example to display a list of contacts from 
the contact application, or it can be a sequence of activities (functions and windows) such as 
when sending a message, a user has to get  the number from  the contact list and then click on 
the send button. 
 
Services 
Services are also called Components, and do not contain any user interface or GUI thread. 
Service processes run in the background. Multiple services execute and perform different 
tasks at the same time, for example, music listening while slow fetching of data over the 
network means long-running tasks performed without any user interaction [17]. Services are 
declared in the xml file "AndroidManifest.xml". 
 
Broadcast Receivers 
 A Broadcast Receiver is used to receive and respond to broadcast announcements. Most of 
the broadcasts are initiated by the system such as by giving notification that the battery power 
is very low. A Broadcast receiver can have any user interface but makes use of a notification 
manager or starts an activity to display alert messages when a broadcast takes place. 
 Content provider 
The Content provider is used to provide application’s data to different components. The data 
can be accessed by different applications and stored on difference places such as a file system 
or on the web. Applications are able to modify the data with the help of a content resolver 
interface which is a class in Android system. 
2.2.3. Libraries 
The Android system provides some C/C++ libraries. Different components of the Android 
system can utilize these libraries. All these libraries are accessible with the help of the 
application framework [18][19].  
 Some of the important libraries of Android system are given below. 
 
 System C Library: This library, also called bionic library is the main library in the Android 
system, and it is a BSD-derived implementation. It is useful for Application developers to 
create applications. 
 Media Libraries: This library depends on PacketVideo's OpenCORE, which provides 
multimedia features for device development. It provides playback and streaming in different 
standard formats of audio, video and images such as MPEG, PNG, and AMR, etc. 
 Surface Manager: It handles 2-D/3-D windows for different applications to provide the 
graphics facility and also provide OpenGL library. 
 Libwebcore: This library supports two types of functionality: Web browser and Embeddable 
web view. 
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2.2.4.  Android runtime 
 
The Android run-time environment consists of two things: first, a set of core libraries that 
gives functionality, which is available in the Java programming language, and the second is 
Dalvik, which is Google’s own virtual machine specially designed for less power usage and 
space and used by the applications in the Android system. Each application runs within its 
own instance of the VM, thus the application processes are completely isolated from each 
other.  
 
Dalvik uses the low level functionality from the Linux kernel such as threading and memory 
management. Before execution of applications, Java files are converted into Dalvik 
Executable (.dex) format for minimal memory footprints. This byte code format is not similar 
to the standard byte code but is more compact and uses less space. It is important since the 
device is small and contains less memory than conventional machines. When building an 
application, a standard development process is followed: source code (.java) is compiled into 
Java byte code after that a dx tool is used, which converts this into .dex file format that is 
capable of running in the Android device.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1:  .java to .dx Conversion[18] 
 
 
2.2.5.  The Linux Kernel 
 
Android is built on the GPLv2 licensed 2.6 [20] Linux kernels with approximately 115 
patches, which provide basic functionality such as memory management, network stacks for 
communication, etc. The reason to build the Android on the Linux kernel is that it is stable, 
provides support for shared libraries, has a variety of device drivers, hardware features and 
contains process management. 
2.3.  Security Mechanisms of Android  
 
The Linux kernel has features like user identifiers, pre-emptive multi-tasking, etc., that is 
used to enforce security between applications and system files. Unlike in desktop Linux 
systems where all application belonging to a user executes with same user id, in the Android 
system each application is assigned a unique identifier and separate instance of its own virtual 
machine so the application code runs in its own memory and process. For sharing data 
between application a “sharedUserId” feature used in the Android system. 
 
Android systems have a permissions based mechanism to enforce security restrictions on 
applications. At installation time, a user has the chance to set flags to allow different 
permissions on applications. By default, a normal level of protection is granted to every 
.Java  javac  .class  jar .jar  dx  .dex 
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application in a manifest file. Initially, the application is not able to access resources such as 
using the GPS, contact lists, writing to another application, accessing network services, etc. 
The installer package shows the lists of permissions where a user can allow or deny these 
permissions. When a user sets the permission then it can easily access the resource and it is 
not possible to revoke these permissions until the application is uninstalled.  
 
Android security mechanisms also use the concept of sand-boxing to implement secure 
multiprocessing of applications. A reference monitor is used for inter-component 
communication (ICC) between applications. The application configuration is also written to 
the manifest file. 
 
Digital certificates are used in application development by developers to sign their code. For 
this, a private key is used which creates trust between applications. Signing of applications 
does not deal with a certificate authority, and self-signed certificates are accepted identifying 
the author of the application. If a developer tries to install an unsigned application, then the 
system will not allow this. 
 
The application also has public and private application components. Private application 
components are only accessible to other components, but not from other applications. Private 
component permission is set in the Manifest file by the developer. Public components are 
accessible to other applications but a developer has the choice to assign permissions to these 
components. 
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Chapter 3 
Port Scanning 
 
The second step of our penetration test was to perform port scanning in order to detect active 
devices, open ports and running services. Port scanning is a technique through which a 
network administrator or even an attacker can determine what types of services are running 
and are publicly accessible, such as an FTP server or a mail server. Applications can contain 
vulnerabilities if they offer services to the network, and are therefore possible targets for 
attacks. The TCP/IP stack can also contain vulnerabilities, regardless of whether any 
applications are running or not, ports can be categorised into three ranges [23] : 
 
 The Well Known Ports (0-1023) 
 The Registered Ports (1024-49151) 
 Dynamic and/or Private Ports (49152-65535) 
 
Well known ports are used for privileged services such as Web servers using port 80 
(assigned by IANA) and many system services use these ports. It is often enough to scan 
these ports to find an interesting service, against which an attack can be performed.  
Registered ports are used by normal programs. Most well-known applications have reserved 
ports in this range.  
 
Dynamic ports, also called as private ports use the range 49,152 to 65,535. Third party 
applications and programs are able to use these ports without risking a collision with any 
well-known applications. 
 
Port scanning can be done though a number of different techniques that are described in the 
white paper of “Port Scanning Techniques and the Defense Against Them” [24]. 
 
We have selected the Nmap tool for port scanning as it is a popular tool. Before describing 
these techniques and results, it’s important to know the mechanism of how a TCP connection 
is established and terminated, since lots of scans violate this process. In the next chapter, we 
explain how a half-open connection can be used to exploit a target system's resources and 
how an established connection is terminated abnormally.  
3.1.  Three way handshake 
To establish a reliable communication link using TCP/IP between two machines (client and 
server), a handshake process must be completed before normal communication begins. The 
handshake process begins with the client sending a packet with the SYN flag set to the server.  
In the reply, the server responds with a SYN/ACK packet. The port must be open to complete 
the handshake process i.e. some service should be running on the particular port.  Finally, the 
client sends an ACK packet back to the server to complete the three way handshake process. 
The Handshake process is shown in the following figure.  
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Figure 3: TCP Connection Establishment [25]. 
 
After this connection establishment, both the client and the server are able to transfer the 
application layer data. To check a particular port’s status that whether it is open or not, it is 
not necessary to complete the handshake process. Only sending the SYN packets and 
analyzing the response is enough to know the port’s status. 
3.2. TCP Connection Termination 
         It is done in the four steps [26]. 
 When a client wants to be disconnected it sends a segment which contains FIN 
message with a last received sequence number. 
 On receiving this segment, server sends an ACK to the client to acknowledging its 
termination request.  
 When the server is finished with its transmission, it creates its own FIN packet and 
then sends it. 
 The client acknowledges this last FIN packet and then connection is closed. 
3.3. Test Scenario 
 
In the test scenario, our Smartphones have two services running, a Web Server and an FTP 
Server named http-proxy and ccproxy-ftp on ports 8080 and 2121 respectively. These 
services were installed by us.  
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Figure 3.1:  Lab Test Scenario 
 
We used a D-Link (DWL-G700AP) Access Point as our central wireless service provider for 
communication. Two computer systems were also used: one to generate different kinds of 
attacks and another to analyze the traffic that was generated during an attack. We used 
Ubuntu 10.04 on both machines. A traffic analyzer (Wireshark 1.2.7) was installed on both 
machines to analyze the information. There are many freely available command line tools to 
check and exploit vulnerabilities, and we selected some widely used and comprehensive 
tools: Nmap for port scanning, Hping3, Dsniff and packit (a Linux command line tool) for 
attacks. These tools were installed on one of the Ubuntu 10.04 system to generate the attacks. 
3.4. Port Scanning Techniques 
3.4.1.  Ping Sweep scan 
Ping Sweep scans are actually not port scans but can give information about whether the 
target device is active or not. It also tells if the target system is protected by a firewall. This 
scan is accomplished by two frames (ICMP echo request and ICMP echo reply). Scan 
command, output and results are given in following table. 
 
Command #nmap -sP 192.168.0.101-103 
Output  
for Android 1.6 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.101 
Host is up (0.13s latency). 
MAC Address: 00:18:41:E8:6F:79 (High Tech Computer) 
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.51 seconds 
Output  
for Android 2.1 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.102 
Host is up (0.10s latency). 
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MAC Address: 10:1D:C0:CF:7C:A0 (Unknown) 
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.53 seconds 
Output  
for Android 2.2 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.103 
Host is up (0.12s latency). 
MAC Address: 38:E7:D8:F8:BD:28 (HTC) 
Nmap done: 1 IP addresses (1 hosts up) scanned in 0.52 seconds 
Tools Nmap, it uses –sP option to detect active host. 
Results All the three hosts are alive and their MAC Addresses are found. 
3.4.2.  Operating System fingerprinting  
OS fingerprinting means to find which operating system is running on the target system. 
Nmap does many tests like SYN scan, IP ID sampling and initial TCP sequence number, and 
window size analysis, and finally compares the result with its own database of systems 
(nmap-os-db) and tries to make a guess about the target operating system [27]. Scan 
command, output and results are given in following table. 
Command #nmap -O 192.168.0.101-103 
Output  
for Android 1.6 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.101 
Host is up (0.053s latency). 
Not shown: 997 closed ports 
PORT  STATE SERVICE 
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open  http-proxy 
MAC Address: 00:18:41:E8:6F:79 (High Tech Computer) 
Device type: general purpose 
Running: Linux 2.6.X 
OS details: Linux 2.6.9 - 2.6.31 
Network Distance: 1 hop 
Output  
for Android 2.1 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.102 
Host is up (0.0035s latency). 
Not shown: 999 closed ports 
PORT     STATE SERVICE 
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open  http-proxy  
MAC Address: 10:1D:C0:CF:7C:A0 (Unknown) 
Device type: general purpose 
Running: Linux 2.6.X 
OS details: Linux 2.6.9 - 2.6.31 
Network Distance: 1 hop 
Output  
for Android 2.2 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.103 
Host is up (0.0066s latency). 
Not shown: 997 closed ports 
PORT  STATE SERVICE 
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open  http-proxy 
MAC Address: 38:E7:D8:F8:BD:28 (HTC) 
Device type: phone 
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Running: Linux 2.6.X 
OS details: Android 2.2 (Linux 2.6.32.15) 
Network Distance: 1 hop 
Tool Nmap ,it uses –O option for OS fingerprinting. 
Results In OS fingerprinting, For Android 1.6 and 2.1, Nmap shows the 
device type as general purpose running Linux 2.6.X.  
 
For Android 2.2, the exact details i.e. OS, version, device type, are 
shown. It does not mean that 1.6 have any mechanism to hide its 
operating system, instead there is no exact match in Nmap database.   
 
We tried this scan with Nmap 5.0 also, and we got the same results for 
1.6, but it does not recognise Android 2.2, rather it shows that the 
device is a Mac system. We, therefore conclude that in Nmap 5.0, 
there is no match for Android 2.2 and in Nmap 5.5, there no exact 
match for Android 1.6 and 2.1. 
3.4.3. The TCP connect scan 
In the connect scan, the tool performs a complete three-way handshake and then immediately 
a RST packet will be sent to close the connection. If the port is closed, the Smartphones sends 
a RST as a response to the SYN packet. Scan command, output and results are given in the 
following table. 
Command #nmap -sT 192.168.0.101-103 
Output  
of Android 1.6 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.101 
Host is up (0.042s latency). 
Not shown: 998 closed ports 
PORT  STATE SERVICE 
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open  http-proxy 
MAC Address: 00:18:41:E8:6F:79 (High Tech Computer) 
Output  
of Android 2.1 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.102 
Host is up (0.027s latency). 
Not shown: 999 closed ports 
PORT     STATE SERVICE 
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open  http-proxy  
MAC Address: 10:1D:C0:CF:7C:A0 (Unknown) 
Output  
of Android 2.2 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.103 
Host is up (0.027s latency). 
Not shown: 998 closed ports 
PORT  STATE SERVICE 
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open  http-proxy 
MAC Address: 38:E7:D8:F8:BD:28 (HTC) 
Tools Nmap, it uses –sT option for connect scan. 
Results The results of this scan are similar to most operating systems. This 
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scan shows all open ports with running services, in this case the ports 
opened by the applications we installed. It also explicitly mentions the 
number of closed ports.  
3.4.4.  SYN Scan 
A SYN Scan is done by sending a single packet with a SYN flag set to the target but the 
three-way handshake is never completed. It is also called “half-open” scan. A SYN-ACK 
reply shows an open port and a RST reply shows closed ports.  
 
The main advantage of this technique is that if an IDS (intrusion detection system) is running, 
which can detect a complete connection being initiated from outside, it might not report a 
SYN scan because RST is sent right after receiving the response from the server. In addition, 
there is normally no connection entry created in the target operating system’s using SYN scan 
since the three-way handshake is never completed and no connection was established. Scan 
command, output and results are given in the following table. 
Command #nmap -sS 192.168.0.101-103 
Output 
of Android 1.6 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.101 
Host is up (0.042s latency). 
Not shown: 998 closed ports 
PORT  STATE SERVICE 
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open  http-proxy 
MAC Address: 00:18:41:E8:6F:79 (High Tech Computer) 
Output  
of Android 2.1 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.102 
Host is up (0.0016s latency). 
Not shown: 999 closed ports 
PORT     STATE SERVICE 
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open  http-proxy  
MAC Address: 10:1D:C0:CF:7C:A0 (Unknown) 
Output  
of Android 2.2 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.103 
Host is up (0.027s latency). 
Not shown: 998 closed ports 
PORT  STATE SERVICE 
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open  http-proxy 
MAC Address: 38:E7:D8:F8:BD:28 (HTC) 
Tools Nmap, It uses –sS option for SYN scan. 
Results SYN scan results are similar to the connect scan because no IDS is 
running on target Android smart-phones. It shows open ports with 
their names and number of close ports.  
3.4.5.  FIN Scan  
In the FIN scan, an attacker sends a packet with the FIN flag set. If the port is closed, a RST 
will be received. However, the system will ignore the packet if the port is open. FIN scan is 
 
 
16 
 
often used to check if a stateless firewall is protecting the system. Scan command, output and 
results are given in the following table. 
Command #nmap -sF 192.168.0.101-103 
Output 
of Android 1.6 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.101 
Host is up (0.022s latency). 
Not shown: 998 closed ports 
PORT  STATE      SERVICE 
2121/tcp open|filtered ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open|filtered http-proxy 
MAC Address: 00:18:41:E8:6F:79 (High Tech Computer) 
Output 
of Android 2.1 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.102 
Host is up (0.0069s latency). 
Not shown: 999 closed ports 
PORT     STATE         SERVICE 
2121/tcp open|filtered ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open|filtered http-proxy  
MAC Address: 10:1D:C0:CF:7C:A0 (Unknown) 
Output  
of Android 2.2 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.103 
Host is up (0.019s latency). 
Not shown: 998 closed ports 
PORT     STATE      SERVICE 
2121/tcp open|filtered ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open|filtered http-proxy 
MAC Address: 38:E7:D8:F8:BD:28 (HTC) 
Tools Nmap , it uses –sF option for Fin Scan. 
Results It tells about closed port on target machines. It shows Open|filtered for 
open ports or ports behind a firewall. There is no built-in firewall in 
Android operating system and therefore Open|filtered means an open 
port on the target.  
3.4.6.  XMAS Scan 
This scan is done by sending a packet in which the FIN, PSH and URG flags are set. A closed 
port will always send RST but if the port is open, the packet will be dropped silently. Scan 
command, output and results are given in the following table. 
 
Command #nmap -sX 192.168.0.101-103 
Output  
for Android 1.6 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.101 
Host is up (0.021s latency). 
Not shown: 998 closed ports 
PORT  STATE      SERVICE 
2121/tcp open|filtered ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open|filtered http-proxy 
MAC Address: 00:18:41:E8:6F:79 (High Tech Computer) 
Output  
for Android 2.1 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.102 
Host is up (0.011s latency). 
Not shown: 999 closed ports 
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PORT     STATE         SERVICE 
2121/tcp open|filtered ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open|filtered http-proxy  
MAC Address: 10:1D:C0:CF:7C:A0 (Unknown) 
Output  
for Android 2.2 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.103 
Host is up (0.0069s latency). 
Not shown: 997 closed ports 
PORT  STATE      SERVICE 
2121/tcp open|filtered ccproxy-ftp 
8080/tcp open|filtered http-proxy 
MAC Address: 38:E7:D8:F8:BD:28 (HTC) 
Tools Nmap, it uses –xS option for xmas scan 
Results Nmap shows Open|filtered ports on machines, when we analyzed the 
traffic using wireshark, the packet sent to these ports were dropped 
which means that the ports are open. 
3.4.7.  NULL Scan 
The Null scan is the used to determine if a port is open or not. To do this, a TCP packet is 
sent with no flags (SYN, RST or ACK is required by the standard). If the reply is RST, then 
the corresponding port is closed, otherwise it is open. Scan command, output and results 
given in the following table. 
 
Command #nmap -sN 192.168.0.101-103 
Output  
for Android 1.6 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.101 
Host is up (0.045s latency). 
All 1000 scanned ports on 192.168.0.101 are open|filtered 
MAC Address: 00:18:41:E8:6F:79 (High Tech Computer) 
Output for Android 
2.1 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.102 
Host is up (0.076s latency). 
All 1000 scanned ports on 192.168.0.102 are open|filtered 
MAC Address: 10:1D:C0:CF:7C:A0 (Unknown) 
Output  
for Android 2.2 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.103 
Host is up (0.76s latency). 
All 1000 scanned ports on 192.168.0.103 are open|filtered 
MAC Address: 38:E7:D8:F8:BD:28 (HTC) 
Tools Nmap, it uses –sN option for Null scan. 
Results When we sent TCP packets with no flags set to Smartphones, the 
Nmap tool gave a result that all ports are open|filtered but there are so 
many ports in the closed state as we already know from the other 
scans, so we analyzed the traffic using wireshark. We were then able 
to see that Android sends response packets with the [RST, ACK] flags 
set for closed ports and drops packets sent to open ports. 
            
We can say that this scan was unsuccessful or does not give any useful 
information while using Nmap tool but when we analyse the traffic 
using Wireshark tool, we can conclude which ports are open and 
which ones are closed. 
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3.4.8.  ACK Scan 
ACK scanning is the most useful technique to determine port status, but it can only determine 
whether the ports are filtered or not. The open and close status will be determined by other 
scans. Scan command, output and results are given in the following table.  
Command # nmap -sA 192.168.0.101-103 
Output  
for Android 1.6 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.101 
Host is up (0.085s latency). 
All 1000 scanned ports on 192.168.0.101 are unfiltered 
MAC Address: 00:18:41:E8:6F:79 (High Tech Computer) 
Output  
for Android 2.1 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.102 
Host is up (0.0021s latency). 
All 1000 scanned ports on 192.168.0.102 are unfiltered 
MAC Address: 10:1D:C0:CF:7C:A0 (Unknown) 
Output  
for Android 2.2 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.1032 
Host is up (0.0021s latency). 
All 1000 scanned ports on 192.168.0.103 are unfiltered 
MAC Address: 38:E7:D8:F8:BD:28 (HTC) 
Tools Nmap, it uses –sA option for Ack scan. 
Results This scan was successful, its shows unfiltered port which means there 
is no firewall installed in the OS.  
3.4.9.  UDP Scan 
UDP port scanning is used for checking for open and closed UDP ports. As UDP does not use 
a three way handshake, only ICMP messages are returned in response. If the ICMP message 
type is 3, the corresponding port is closed and any other reply indicates an open port. Scan 
command, output and results are given in the following table. 
 
Command nmap -sU -F 192.168.0.101-103 
 
Output  
for Android 1.6 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.101 
Host is up (0.098s latency). 
All  scanned ports on 192.168.0.101 are closed 
MAC Address: 00:18:41:E8:6F:79 (High Tech Computer) 
 Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.102 
Host is up (0.011s latency). 
Not shown: 999 closed ports 
PORT     STATE         SERVICE 
All  scanned ports on 192.168.0.102 are closed 
MAC Address: 10:1D:C0:CF:7C:A0 (Unknown) 
Output  
for Android 2.2 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.103 
Host is up (0.19s latency). 
All  scanned ports on 192.168.0.102 are closed 
MAC Address: 38:E7:D8:F8:BD:28 (HTC) 
Tools Nmap, its uses –sU option for UDP scan. 
Results All the three target devices show that all scanned UDP ports are 
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closed. 
 
3.5.  Tools Used 
Nmap 5.5: Nmap is a popular and widely useful tool for port scanning. It includes a network 
scanning guide and it is a free and open source utility for network discovery. It has support to 
run on a variety of Operating Systems like UNIX and Windows. It contains features like host 
discovery, port scan and OS detection. 
 
Wireshark (1.2.7): We analysed the traffic using Wireshark (1.2.7), which is a free network 
protocol analyser. Packets were captured from scans and analysed to deeply understand the 
data being exchanged. Wireshark was running on one ubuntu machine to capture and analyze 
the wireless traffic during our tests. 
3.6.  Summary 
Port scanning was used to discover information about the target systems. Information that 
was gathered in this step will be useful to further enhance the penetrating tests towards 
specific attacks. 
         
It is important to mention that the Android system was not recognised and matched by Nmap 
5.0 in its database of systems rather it gives a range of Linux kernel versions for 1.6 and 2.1 
but no information about 2.1. When we tested with Nmap 5.5, we still got the same results for 
1.6 and 2.1 but for 2.2, we got the exact match of operating system with even exact match of 
the Linux kernel that is 2.6.32.15. 
        
Most of the results of this port scanning are similar to that of Linux with the corresponding 
kernels i.e. Android 1.6 and 2.1 with Linux kernel 2.6.29 and Android 2.2 with Linux kernel 
2.6.32.  
        
The typical risk related to these scan results is low according to CAPEC-300 documentation 
[28]. As we have followed CAPEC-300 documentation for complete port scanning, we also 
tried the some other scans but did not find any useful information.  
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Chapter 4 
Attacks on the Android Network Stack 
 
TCP/IP implementations have in the past had serious security flaws like being susceptible to 
buffer overflow attacks and flaws like TCP sequence number prediction, etc. These security 
flaws have been identified and patched over time. The current TCP/IP suite is not the result 
of a straight-forward planned process instead it is the result of an evolution that is still 
continuing today. Most of the time this process has been a post active solution i.e. whenever 
vulnerability was found, action was taken to overcome that particular vulnerability. Pro-
active steps could be more useful to find vulnerabilities that arise due to new functionality 
and development of new applications. 
 
 To begin with, we first looked at Smartphone vulnerabilities from the past, for example 
Symbian systems that were vulnerable to spread Malware by sending SMS messages, iPhone 
Smartphones had problems like “Fixed SMS vulnerably'[29]” though which a hacker could 
gain full control, and the Brador virus, which was found in Windows CE operating system of 
packet PC devices, which lead to a complete operating system restart[30] and Windows 
Mobile Operating System which is vulnerable to ARP spoofing and SYN flooding attacks 
[31]. These different types of vulnerabilities show typical risks in Smartphone systems, and 
therefore security testing is an important tool to minimize such threats in the Smartphones. 
 
Android is based on several components for communication, and its network stack is taken 
from the Linux kernel which was compressed in size and with a lot of changes. It consists of 
a large number of network protocols for communication like TCP, UDP, and BNEP 
(Bluetooth Network Encapsulation Protocol), etc. 
   
The communication between mobile devices can be interfered with in different ways, some of 
them are given below and our attacks also fall in to these categories. 
 
Eavesdropping: In this attack the traffic is sniffed through different network sniffing tools. 
After an interception of a packet, an attacker is able to extract information, e.g. the 
information that is exchanged during the three way handshake process, sequence numbers, 
ACK number, destination port etc. This information can be used to interfere with the 
communication between the target devices. 
 
The Man-in-the-Middle Attack: An attacker can modify the contents of packets and take 
over a session between two communicating devices by intercepting the communication. Most 
often, a network packet sniffer is used to perform this attack. The man-in-the middle can be 
an internal user or someone from an outside network. Along with session hijacking, the goals 
for a man-in-the middle can be to eavesdrop information, cause denial of services, etc. 
 
 Denial of Service Attack: This attack aim to stop the authorized user to access any services 
or information. Most denial of service attacks are caused by traffic flooding over the Internet.  
 
The table below describes the attacks with respect to OSI layers. 
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Transport layer SYN flooding, ACK flooding, Null flooding 
and UDP flooding. 
Network Layer ICMP flooding, Ping of Death, Smurf, and 
Land Attack. 
Data link layer Gratuitous ARP Request, Fake Arp Reply 
using Broadcast. 
                                         Table 4: Attacks with respect to layers 
4.1. SYN Flooding 
SYN Flooding is an old attack performed by violating the TCP/IP handshake mechanism. In 
this attack, the attacker sends multiple SYN messages with spoofed IP addresses to the victim 
server's open ports. The server then responds with a SYN-ACK packet. The attacker 
continues with more SYN packets instead of sending an ACK packet. Consequently, a lot of 
half-open TCP sessions are established. However, a server has a table of fixed size for half-
open (pending) connections. And once it is full, no new connections can be accepted, 
therefore this lead to denial of service for legal users. Attack command and results are given 
in the following table. 
 
Command sudo hping3 -S 192.168.0.101 -p 8080 --flood  
sudo hping3 -S 192.168.0.101 -p 2121 –flood 
Result for 
Android 
1.6 
When we performed SYN flooding on the open ports, it did not respond to any 
hosts on the network until the flooding of SYN packet was stopped. It was also 
observed that the Smartphone became relatively slow in response to 
applications when compared to the response before the attack. 
Result for 
Android 
2.1 
SYN flooding attack is successful on 2.1, and networked applications were not 
able to access open services. When we checked system respond times, we 
observed no difference or delays in response of applications. 
Result for 
Android 
2.2 
Response to SYN flooding is same as for other versions but the device is 
almost irresponsive!! . 
4.2.  ACK Flooding 
This attack is performed by sending a large number of TCP packets with the ACK flag set, so 
the targeted operating system will consume all CPU time to check earlier related SYN 
messages against these ACKs. Attack command and results are given in the following table. 
 
Command sudo hping3 -A 192.168.0.104 -p 8080 –flood 
sudo hping3 -A 192.168.0.104 -p 2121 –flood 
Result for 
Android 
1.6 
When we performed ACK flooding on the open ports, it did not respond to any 
hosts on the network until the flooding of ACK packet was stopped. The 
Smartphone also comes to a halt after 5 to 10 seconds if this attack continues 
and it gives response as soon as we stop flooding with ACK packets. 
Result for 
2.1 
ACK flooding saturates the network interface of 2.1 but there is no difference 
in regular usage of application that doesn’t require network communication. 
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Result for 
2.2 
Target Smartphone did not respond to any network packet that was destined 
for its address. In addition the Smartphone becomes completely unresponsive 
in any functionality. 
4.3.  TCP Null Flooding 
Null flooding is used to increase server delay for the services which are running on the 
server. By sending large amount of TCP packets with no flag set to mobile, the attacker can 
successfully produce a denial of service attack. Attack command and results are given in the 
following table. 
 
Command sudo hping3 -Y 192.168.0.101 -a 192.168.0.103 –flood 
Result for 
Android 
1.6 
During this attack, system performance became extremely slow and after some 
time mobile was stuck with this message “Force close or Wait “ of application 
that is currently running. When we click on “Force close” or “Wait” then after 
some seconds this message appears again. Due to flooding, the mobile was 
unable to provide service to any host. 
Result for 
Android 
2.1 
When we sent a large amount of TCP packets with no flag to the Android 2.1, 
it did not respond to any hosts on the network. There is no difference in 
performance of normal application usage. 
Result for 
Android 
2.2 
This attack is successful on 2.2 also and the system response time is 
significantly changed during this attack. 
4.4. RST Attack 
RST is used to abort a TCP connection. By sending packet with RST set and a correct 
sequence number with the spoofed address, an attacker can abort the active connection. 
Attack command and results are given in the following table. 
 
Command sudo packit -s 192.168.0.99 -d 192.168.0.102 -S 56893 -D 2121 -F R -q 
2676420498 -c 1 -b 20 -e 00:09:5b:e3:6d:7e  
Result for 
Android 
1.6 
We analyzed the traffic through Wireshark and noticed the sequence number 
with the command mentioned above; we generated an RST packet with a 
correct sequence number and successfully aborted the established connection.  
Result for 
Android 
2.1 
Result is same on this version too. 
Result for 
Android 
2.2 
Result is same on this version too. 
4.5.  UDP Flooding 
In this attack, a flood of UDP packets is sent an open port of server. The mobile server may 
be unable to respond to the client. Attack command and results are given in the following 
table. 
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Command sudo hping3 -2 192.168.0.101 –flood 
Result for 
Android 
1.6 
This attack is successful, when we sent the ping packet to Smartphones  
, we got very slow response. Smartphone's performance is slightly decreased 
when we uses the applications 
Result for 
Android 
2.1 
This attack is successful, same like 1.6.  
Result for 
Android 
2.2 
Mobile give very slow response to ping request and its performance 
significantly disturbed when we used the applications of the Smartphones. 
4.6.  ICMP Flood 
This attack is performed by sending large amount of ping packets (ICMP echo) to the target 
system. Target System may become busy and not respond to legal users. Attack command 
and results are given in the following table. 
 
Command sudo hping3 192.168.0.101 -1 –flood 
Result for 
Android 
1.6 
Target did not reply to any packets and system performance became very slow.
Result for 
Android 
2.1 
Target system did not reply to any packets and performance of the system was 
normal. 
Result for 
Android 
2.2 
Like other previously described attacks, 2.2 have the same behaviour as 1.6 
and its response to ICMP flooding reduced performance. 
4.6 Ping of Death 
Ping of death has been quite successful in the past. This attack is performed by sending over-
sized packets, larger than permitted IP size, i.e. 65535 bytes to the system. The goal with this 
attack is to halt or shut down the system. Attack command and results are given in the 
following table. 
 
Command We use a program that is written in C language to generate ping of death 
attack [32]. 
Result for 
Android 
1.6 
This attack is unsuccessful and the victim is not accepting the last offset of 
packet. It silently dropped the packet. 
Result for 
Android 
2.1 
Its behaviour is same as for 1.6. 
Result for 
Android 
2.2 
Its behaviour is same as for 1.6. 
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4.7.  LAND Attack 
In this attack malicious packets are sent to the target device with the same source and 
destination IP address. Many operating systems in the past ended up in a loop that lead to a 
halt of the system but newer systems should be patched. Attack command and results are 
given in the following table. 
 
Command sudo hping3 -1 192.168.0.103 -a 192.168.0.103 
Result for 
Android 
1.6 
Android is protected against the Land attack. It just drops the packet of ICMP 
that has same source and destination address. 
Result for 
Android 
2.1 
The packet is silently dropped. 
Result for 
Android 
2.2 
The packet is silently dropped. 
4.8.  Teardrop Attack 
This attack is performed by sending fragmented packets to the target. These fragmented IP 
packets overlap and can cause problems while the receiver tries to reassemble the datagram. 
Attack command and results are given in the following table. 
 
Command We used a program that is written in C language to generate teardrop 
attack [32]. 
Result for 
Android 
1.6 
Android 1.6 is not prone to the teardrop attack. It silently drops the packets 
that have overlapping IP fragments during reassembly of the received 
fragmented packet. 
Result for 
Android 
2.1 
Android 2.1 has same behaviour as for Android 1.6. 
Result for 
Android 
2.2 
Android 2.2 has same behaviour as for Android 1.6. 
 
4.9.  Gratuitous ARP Request  
It is an unsolicited request that does not need any reply from the network host. When a host 
announces its presence in the network then this Gratuitous ARP request is performed. 
The attack can be done by sending forged MAC address to the victim containing another 
host’s IP address. The purpose is to hijack the traffic of victim. Attack command and results 
are given in the following table. 
 
Command sudo packit -t arp -A 1 -x 192.168.0.102 -X 00:09:5b:e3:6d:79 -y 
192.168.0.102 -Y ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff -e 38:e7:d8:f8:bd:28 -E ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff -i 
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eth0 -c 0 
Result for 
Android 
1.6  
 When we sent faked gratuitous ARP request to the target, it updated its ARP 
cache. The target device now contained the wrong MAC address for that IP 
address. When it receives a new correct gratuitous ARP message then it gets a 
correct MAC address for that host. 
Result for 
Android 
2.1 
We observed the same results for 2.1. 
sResult for 
Android 
2.2 
We observed the same results for 2.2. 
4.10.  Fake ARP Reply using Broadcast  
The Attacker sends spoofed ARP messages to a victim. The purpose of this attack is to hijack 
the traffic of a victim by sending fake ARP requests using the IP address of the host but with 
the attacker’s MAC address. When this fake ARP request arrives in the victim system, it will 
change entry in ARP table to these new IP and MAC addresses. Attack command and results 
are given in the following table. 
 
Command sudo arpspoof -i eth0 192.168.0.101 
Result for 
Android 
1.6 
In response of the ARP request we sent fake ARP reply. This Fake reply 
message contains attacker system MAC address with forged IP address. When 
target operating system sends the traffic to forged IP address then all traffic 
redirected to attacker system. 
Result for 
Android 
2.1 
The behaviour against this attack was similar as of Android 1.6. 
Result for 
Android 
2.2 
The behaviour against this attack was similar as of Android 1.6. 
 
4.11. Summary 
Although Android is a relatively new operating system, we can think about it as a mature 
system because it is based on the Linux kernel. Most conventional attacks were not 
successful, for example, Ping of Death, Land attack and Teardrop. 
 
One security flaw in the Android system that we didn't see any special kind of protection 
against, was handling of flooding attacks, which were quite successful, and the system were 
unable to give a response to network during these attacks. We also noticed a significant 
difference in their behaviour against flooding attacks. Android 1.6's performance decreased, 
due to the user interface was affected during the attack and its response time increased. The 
most interesting observation during the experiment was that although Android 2.1 response 
time was not at all affected by the flooding attacks, there was a significant increase in 
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response time of Android 2.2 during the time. This is surprising since Android 2.2 is based on 
a newer Linux kernel (2.6.32) and it is expected to be less prone to attacks. 
 
It was observed that the flooding attack against a closed port is also successful, and during 
this attack, the system is unable to communicate with any other device and performance is 
even worse than the performance during flooding of an open port. 
 
Android is vulnerable to most ARP attacks like gratuitous ARP flooding, which can be used 
to broadcast wrong MAC entry for a particular IP address. This MAC address can be an 
unknown host who is not present on the network or it can be the address of the attacker's 
machine. This kind of attack can be used to reroute traffic or to deny any service to the 
victim. It does not matter whether this ARP reply is unicast or broadcast, in both cases the 
Android Smartphone enters this received fake IP-MAC binding in its ARP cache. Like most 
operating systems, Android doesn't have any mechanism to prevent this kind of attacks. 
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Chapter 5 
Results and Conclusions 
Android is an open source platform that provides lots of features for application developers. 
There is always a risk that a hacker can install some malwares which affects system 
functionality. However, the Android system provides a security mechanism which allows 
setting security permissions (normal, dangerous, signature level) according to the 
application's  needs, and whether it wants to share some resources or not. By using the 
security permission mechanism a user can minimize the security risks for software which 
may contain bugs, malicious software, etc. and be able to protect his/her sensitive data.  
  
Security assessment of the Android system is important because of its high usage is high on 
the Smartphone market. To asses this, we have performed penetration testing of Android 
Smartphones connected to a WLAN network.  The first phase of our work was to gather 
information about the Android system such as that its version history, architecture and 
security mechanism.  
 
First, we performed various scans to find vulnerabilities in three different Android versions.  
When doing this, we were able to gather information regarding the target host such as 
whether it is active or not, and see the status of different ports and the services running on it. 
We have also shown that it is possible to perform OS fingerprinting over the network so an 
attacker can determine the version of the operating system, which in turn can be used to find 
security flaws in the connected device. 
 
Secondly, we performed different types of attacks against the Android network stack. Starting 
with Flooding Attacks which can be done in different ways like SYN, UDP, ICMP flooding. 
These attacks can lead to denial of service by consuming all resources such as bandwidth, 
memory and CPU. 
 
We have also performed some historical attacks like Ping of Death, Teardrop and the Land 
Attack. The Android system is secure when it comes to dealing with oversized ICMP 
datagram’s and it just ignores the oversized packets. It does the same with the Teardrop and 
Land attacks. 
  
Most link-layer attacks were successful on the Android system. ARP poisoning was 
successful and it was performed by sending fake ARP updates to the target host. 
Consequently traffic was redirected to a destination chosen by the attacker. DoS (Denial of 
service), Session hijacking and Man-in-the-Middle attacks were successful at link layer by 
sending false MAC addresses. 
 
The main purpose of this work has been to perform penetration testing of Android 
Smartphones. The Android system does not contain hardware encryption, security keys and 
data recovery facilities, just to mention some shortcomings in the Android system.  However, 
some security mechanisms are used in the Android system which is able to control the 
security risk, for example the functionality for users to grant privileges to applications when 
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installing them. Therefore, we can conclude that the Android system is a relatively trusted OS 
and our findings in this report should inspire the mobile OS vendors to address the security 
flaws we have found and improve system functionality, especially the behaviour when the 
devices are flooded with various kinds of traffic. 
 
5.1. Future Work 
Due to the growing number of malware, cross scripting attacks, SQL injection and buffer 
overflow attacks, future work is needed: 
 
 Security analysis of Android Libraries and run-time environment. 
 Analysis of security in Application layer protocols of Android-based Smartphones. 
 
There are so many C/C ++ and java libraries in Android system such as the media, graphic 
library, etc. Their run-time environment is different than normal applications in the 
Smartphone and therefore, more effort should be spent to investigate the security issues in 
this area.  
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